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THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEFERRAL: 
LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF THE 2004 
CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN 
Shamshad Pasarlay†  
Abstract:  In an important recent work, Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg 
noted that constitution writers regularly choose to defer to the future important questions 
of constitutional design. They argue that an “optimal” level of constitutional deferral 
might contribute to constitutional stability and help constitutions live longer.  This Article 
argues that although constitution makers might choose to defer on many important 
questions of constitutional design to promote agreement, certain types of deferral might 
turn out to be counterproductive, and thus constitution writers’ choice to defer should be 
limited. The Article highlights that it is risky to defer to future legislatures the powers of 
institutions (such as apex courts) that are empowered under the constitution to answer 
other implicit deferrals. Deferring the powers of apex courts is extremely dangerous 
because such deferrals can potentially politicize the courts’ relationship with the political 
branches of the government. In response, the political branches of government might 
choose to resolve deferrals on the powers of apex courts in a retaliatory fashion that could 
limit the powers of apex courts and undermine the legitimacy and independence. 
Deferrals on the powers of the judiciary may simply give downstream legislatures a tool 
to hold apex courts hostage by threatening to amend their laws and strip them of their 
powers.  To highlight this problem, this Article explores the decision of the makers of the 
2004 Constitution of Afghanistan to defer on the powers of the Supreme Court and the 
Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution 
to interpret the Constitution and exercise all types of judicial review. Afghanistan’s 
experience operating under the 2004 Constitution gives an important example of the 
limits of constitutional deferral.  
Cite as:  Shamshad Pasarlay, The Limits of Constitutional Deferral: Lessons from the 
History of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 683 (2018). 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Constitution writers often work under challenging conditions.  In an 
ideal world, they might be able to draft a perfect constitution—one that 
elaborates fully the values of the state and the decision-making processes by 
which the state would realize those values in the future.  Nevertheless, 
constitution makers face serious constraints (such as time, political interests, 
and minimum consensus) that make agreement on important questions a 
concern for constitution drafting.  These constraints most often force 
constitution makers to defer to the future important questions of 
constitutional design, including issues of government structure, basic rights, 
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and judicially enforceable limits on government conduct. 1   Theorists of 
constitutional deferral argue that certain types of deferrals can occasionally 
be useful in promoting productive ongoing negotiations of contested 
constitutional principles and thus can help a constitution endure longer.2  
However, these theorists state that deferrals are not optimal for all issues of 
constitutional design.  Specifically, they are not in favor of the idea that 
constitutions should leave some important questions of governmental 
structure undecided.3 
 
Building on this insight, this Article explores a type of dangerous 
deferral in constitutional design.  It highlights that constitution makers might 
choose to defer strategically on many important questions of constitutional 
design, but not all types of deferral are useful.  Certain types of 
constitutional deferral are indeed counterproductive. 4   For instance, it is 
dangerous to defer on the powers of apex courts that are empowered under 
the constitution to answer other implicit deferrals in a constitution.  
Deferrals on the powers of apex courts can result in political conflicts 
between the judiciary and the political branches of the government that can 
threaten the independence and institutional security of the judiciary. 5  
Moreover, downstream legislatures may refuse to empower courts to resolve 
implicit constitutional deferrals, leading to critical constitutional crises every 
time a constitutional dispute emerges between the political branches of the 
government. 
 
To highlight the dangers associated with deferrals on the powers of 
apex courts, this Article explores the decision of the makers of the 2004 
Constitution of Afghanistan to defer on the powers of the Supreme Court 
and the Independent Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation 
of the Constitution (“the Commission”) to interpret the Constitution and 
exercise all types of judicial review functions.  This Article shows how 
deferrals in this respect exacerbated political tensions between the legislature 
and the judiciary, creating a political crisis over which institution should 
                                                        
1 See generally Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in 
Constitutional Design, 9 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 636 (2011). 
2 Id.; see also Clark B. Lombardi, The Constitution as an Agreement to Agree: The Social and 
Political Foundation (and Effects) of the 1971 Egyptian Constitution, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 398, 425–26 (Dennis Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013). 
3 Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 664–66; see also Hanna Lerner, Constitution-Writing in 
Deeply Divided Societies: The Incrementalist Approach, 16 NATIONS & NATIONALISM 68, 84 (2010). 
4 Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 664. 
5 Lerner, supra note 3, at 84. 
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interpret the Constitution and review the constitutionality of legislation.  
This Article further shows how the legislature used deferrals to refuse to 
empower the Supreme Court to exercise its constitutional right to interpret 
the Constitution and exercise all types of judicial review functions.  In fact, 
the legislature took advantage of deferrals in these areas to undermine the 
independence and institutional viability of the Supreme Court and the 
Commission. 6   On certain occasions, the legislature and the executive 
threatened to amend the laws that define the powers of the Supreme Court 
and the Commission—a counterproductive development and one which the 
Supreme Court and the Commission both have no power to evade.7 
 
The rest of this Article is organized as follows:  Part II describes the 
literature on constitutional deferral and constitutional ambiguity.  It then 
discusses the effects of these types of deferrals on both constitutional 
stability and longevity.  Part III explores the decision of the drafters of the 
2004 Constitution of Afghanistan to defer the powers of the Supreme Court 
and the Commission to the ordinary legislature.  Part IV explores how 
deferral on the powers of the Supreme Court and the Commission resulted in 
direct political confrontation between the judiciary and the legislature, 
triggering a political crisis over constitutional interpretation and judicial 
review in Afghanistan.  This Part further reveals that the executive and the 
legislature both took advantage of these deferrals, partially resolving them in 
a way that served their interests and weakened both the Supreme Court and 
the Commission.  Part V reveals how the legislature is holding the law of the 
Commission hostage by threatening to amend it and strip the Commission of 
its powers every time the Commission’s decisions do not align with the 
interests of the legislature. 
 
Finally, Part VI concludes by highlighting that the powers and 
structure of institutions (such as constitutional courts) entrusted by a 
constitution to resolve implicit deferrals might be the most important aspect 
of a constitution and that it needs to be decided at the outset by 
constitutional framers. By failing to resolve the important issue of the 
powers of highest courts within a constitution, the framers might render the 
                                                        
6 See Shamshad Pasarlay, When Courts Decide Not to Decide: Understanding the Afghan Supreme 
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day-to-day function of government extremely difficult.  Specifically, in 
fragile and nascent democracies like Afghanistan, the legislature may be ill-
suited to define the powers of the judiciary to resolve other implicit deferrals 
in the Constitution.  In fact, downstream legislatures might simply strip the 
judiciary of such powers.  In these contexts, unresolved questions of the 
powers and organization of highest courts engender costly political crises 
every time a dispute emerges between the legislature and the executive over 
a constitutional question. 
 
II. THE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEFERRAL  
 
In many countries, the moment of constitution-making is often 
considered an exceptional period of time, one in which the society’s focus 
on constitutional provisions and on the rewards of consensus create unique 
opportunities.  According to this view, constitution makers should thus be 
encouraged to answer foundationally important questions about the state up 
front so that the polity can move on with a shared set of values and 
commitments to the state.8  It is at this founding moment that a society is 
most likely to get the best possible answers on fundamental questions of 
constitutional design.  However, at the same time, the moment of 
constitutional founding is also a dangerous period of time riddled with high 
passions and interests.  Drafting a constitution under such conditions usually 
involves making choices under constraints, including lack of agreement, 
resources, time, and information. 9   These constraints might lead to 
significant “decision” and “error” costs if drafters attempt to answer all 
important questions of constitutional design at the time of constitution 
writing.10 
 
Moreover, in deeply divided societies,11 the constitutional founding 
moment is considered the worst possible time for people to try and settle 
                                                        
8 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); CARL SCHMITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2008); Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the 
Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE. L.J. 364 (1995). 
9 See generally Elster, supra note 8.  
10 Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 641–46. 
11 A society is deeply divided if it (1) contains a variety of different ethnic, religious, linguistic, or 
cultural communities; and (2) the ethno-cultural, religious, or other societal cleavages in the society form 
basis of political mobilization and translate into political fragmentation over a substantial period of time 
and a wide variety of issues. See Ian Lustick, Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Constitutionalism 
versus Control, 31 WORLD POL. 325 (1979); Sujit Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and 
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foundational questions of constitutional design, including questions of 
national identity and religious values. 12   In countries marked by such 
divisions, the process of constitution-making is fraught with great risk of 
political crisis. 13   In these deeply divided societies, it might not be 
productive to pressure groups with different ethnic and/or religious identities 
to agree in advance upon foundational questions of national and religious 
identity. Because there is no minimum consensus, if people of a deeply 
divided society focus on these foundational questions at the drafting stage, it 
will only highlight their differences and might lead to political crisis.14  Each 
ethno-religious community might try to use the constitutional process to 
maximize its own interests, making agreement on foundational questions of 
a polity extremely difficult. 
 
As a result, to avoid costs associated with constitutional design and 
promote agreement at the drafting stage, constitution makers sometimes 
choose to leave some significant questions undecided, or defer them to the 
future.15  Specifically, in deeply divided countries, constitutional deferral 
plays a constructive role.  It enables constitution framers to distract attention 
from the most divisive issues until after institutions and habits of democratic 
discourse have taken root, allowing these societies to create workable 
arrangements by which less fundamental issues can be resolved to people’s 
mutual satisfaction.16  In short, deferral allows deeply divided countries to 
keep the debate on controversial issues ongoing and resolve them through 
constructive dialogue after the drafting stage. 
 
Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg define constitutional deferral as a 
conscious decision by constitution writers not to decide a contentious 
(though equally important) question of constitutional design in the 
constitution, thereby leaving it to be decided through the process of ordinary 
politics by ordinary institutions, namely the legislature and the judiciary.17  
                                                                                                                                                                     
Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION 5 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2008). 
12 See generally HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES (2011); 
see also Asli Bâli & Hanna Lerner, Constitutional Design without Constitutional Moment: Lessons from 
Religiously Divided Societies, 49 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 227, 228–29 (2016). 
13 See LERNER, supra note 12, at 1; see also Lerner, supra note 3, at 68–69. 
14 See Bâli & Lerner, supra note 12, at 228–29; see also Lerner, supra note 3. 
15 Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 636–37; see also Mark Tushnet, Constitution-Making: An 
Introduction, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1983, 2007 (2013). 
16 See LERNER, supra note 12; Bâli & Lerner, supra note 12, at 293. 
17 See Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 637. 
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That is to say, constitution makers often avoid any attempt to resolve in the 
constitutional text certain important constitutional questions.18  Instead, they 
leave future political institutions freedom to resolve those questions at some 
less fraught time in the future when greater consensus is formed and the risk 
of decision and error cost has faded.19 
 
Theorists of constitutional deferral have identified several different 
types of constitutional deferral.  The first type explicitly identifies an 
important issue of constitutional design and states that it is to be resolved by 
the future legislature after the constitution is promulgated.20  This type of 
deferral uses a “by-law clause” in the text of the constitution, and is the 
method on which Dixon and Ginsburg focus their attention.21  Deferrals 
through by-law clauses indicate that constitution writers wish to 
constitutionalize an important question of constitutional design in some 
form, but because of the lack of agreement on the answers to such questions 
and/or lack of information that might lead to decision costs, they do not 
attempt to answer them in the text of the constitution. 22   Constitution 
designers instead choose to leave these questions for future resolution by the 
legislature.23 
 
Another common form of deferral is implicit constitutional deferral, 
or deferral of significant constitutional questions to constitutional courts.24  
In this case, constitution writers strategically and deliberately use unclear, 
ambiguous, or ambivalent language to describe a structural constitutional 
rule or a constitutional right, thus implicitly deferring particular 
constitutional provisions to the future.25  Implicit constitutional deferral thus 
does not attempt to resolve a controversial question in the constitution.  
Instead, it requires that the ambiguous constitutional rule should be 
interpreted and resolved in the future by institutions entrusted by the 
                                                        
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 638. 
20 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2009; Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 643–46. 
21 Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 639–50. 
22 Id. at 639–40. 
23 Id. 
24 Tushnet, supra note 15, at 2007; Lombardi, supra note 2, at 409. 
25 Lombardi, supra note 2, at 409; see also CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT 
CONSTITUTIONS DO 96 (2001) (discussing the strategic uses of ambiguity and deferral in constitution-
drafting). 
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constitution that have the power to interpret the constitution and resolve 
constitutional ambiguities.26 
 
Scholars of constitutional deferral are not only interested in 
typologizing deferral but also in its impacts on constitutional optimality, 
longevity, and stability. 27   They argue that an “optimal” level of 
constitutional deferral can occasionally be useful in promoting productive 
ongoing negotiations of constitutional principles and thus might contribute 
to constitutional stability and help constitutions survive longer. 28   This 
Article does not intend to question this claim.  In fact, the history of Afghan 
constitutions in general, and that of the 2004 Constitution in particular, 
provides evidence to support the claim that an optimal level of constitutional 
deferral might help constitutions endure longer.29 
 
However, constitutional deferrals are not optimal for all issues of 
constitutional design.  Dixon and Ginsburg point out that it is important that 
constitution writers do not rely on deferral too much.  They must settle 
within the constitution certain basic procedural questions that are important 
and enable the democratic function of the government. 30   Theorists of 
constitutional deferral warn that deferral should not impede the ability of 
government institutions (legislatures or courts) to resolve key constitutional 
questions in the future. 31   This impediment will negatively impact the 
survival and the expected optimality of constitutions.  These types of 
deferrals are likely “to undermine popular support for the existing 
constitutional system in a way that also increases support for efforts to create 
new governmental arrangements by extra-constitutional means.”32  This is 
exactly what happened in Afghanistan in the 1970s.33  The 1964 Afghan 
                                                        
26 Lombardi, supra note 2, at 409. 
27 Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 643–46; Lombardi, supra note 2, at 409; Shamshad Pasarlay, 
Rethinking Afghanistan’s Longest-Lived Constitution: The 1931 Constitution Through the Lens of 
Constitutional Endurance and Performance Literature, 10 ELON L. REV. 101 (forthcoming 2018) 
[hereinafter Pasarlay, Rethinking Afghanistan’s Longest-Lived Constitution]. 
28 Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 663–67; Lombardi supra note 2, at 426. 
29 See Shamshad Pasarlay, Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan: A History and Analysis 
Through the Lens of Coordination and Deferral Theory, 261–302 (June 10, 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with author) [hereinafter Pasarlay, Making the 2004 
Constitution of Afghanistan]; see also Pasarlay, Rethinking Afghanistan’s Longest-Lived Constitution, 
supra note 27, at 104. 
30 Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 664. 
31 Id. at 666; see also Lerner, supra note 3, at 84. 
32 Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 666. 
33 See generally Mohammad Hashim Kamali, The Fall of a Monarchy in Afghanistan, 9 INT’L. J. 
MIDDLE EAST STUD. 195 (1978). 
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Constitution had legalized the formation of political parties, but it deferred 
to the legislature to define the structure and organizations of political 
parties.34  However, the implementing legislation was never ratified.  This 
failure not only deprived Afghanistan of an important tool for 
institutionalizing democracy, but it also led to the collapse of the 1964 
constitutional order and the monarchy that it had established.35 
 
Similarly, the history of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan thus far 
indicates that it is important that constitution makers settle the powers of 
apex courts that are expected to resolve other implicit deferrals.  Authorizing 
downstream legislatures to define the powers of the judiciary by using a by-
law clause in the constitution is extremely dangerous. These deferrals might 
result in direct political conflicts between the legislature and the judiciary 
that may in turn undermine the judiciary’s independence and institutional 
security.  In other words, deferrals on the powers and organization of apex 
constitutional courts might mean that these courts fail to resolve 
fundamental constitutional questions in the future. These dangers can affect 
the expected optimality, stability, and longevity of written constitutions and, 
in nascent democracies like Afghanistan, might create serious problems by 
making constitutions more fragile. 
 
III. THE 2002–2004 CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF 
THE DRAFTING OF ARTICLES 121 AND 157 OF THE 2004 CONSTITUTION  
 
Following the removal of the Taliban regime in October 2001, the 
United Nations (“UN”) brought together leading Afghan groups to Bonn, 
Germany, to discuss plans for a future government in Afghanistan.36  The 
meeting in Germany resulted in the signing of the Agreement on Provisional 
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent 
Government Institutions, commonly known as the Bonn Agreement (“the 
Agreement”).37  The Agreement set up a timetable for a two-year transitional 
                                                        
34 THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN [AFG. CONST. 1964] [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 1, 1964, art. 32. 
35 See Mohammad Hasan Kakar, The Fall of the Afghan Monarchy in 1973, 9 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. 
STUD. 195, 199, 207–08, 214 (1978). 
36 See generally ZALMAY KHALILZAD, THE ENVOY: FROM KABUL TO THE WHITE HOUSE, MY 
JOURNEY THROUGH A TURBULENT WORLD (2016); see also JAMES DOBBINS, AFTER THE TALIBAN: 
NATION-BUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN (2008); Chris Johnson et al., AFGHANISTAN’S POLITICAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, OVERSEAS DEV. INST. 3 (2003). 
37 J. Alexander Thier, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 557, 566 
(2007). 
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period.38  It established an interim government that would be followed by a 
transitional administration. 39   The Transitional Administration was 
responsible for drafting a new constitution within eighteen months after it 
was established. 40   The Transitional Administration initiated the 
constitution-making process in October 2002 when President Hamid Karzai 
appointed the Constitutional Drafting Commission to prepare a first draft of 
the new constitution.41  The process ended in January 2004 when President 
Karzai signed and promulgated the new Constitution of Afghanistan.42 
 
The text of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan makes clear that the 
people involved in its drafting and revision engaged in systematic 
constitutional deferrals.43  Deferrals in the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan 
came explicitly through by-law clauses and, in some places, implicitly 
through strategic ambiguity. 44   For instance, the framers of the 2004 
Constitution engaged in very heated debates over ideology, particularly over 
the question of whether Islamic values or liberal principles should place 
limits on legislative and executive discretion. 45   However, when the 
Constitution was written, the drafters managed to develop ambiguous 
formulas that did not seem to resolve the contested ideological questions.46  
All factions involved in the 2002–2004 constitutional negotiations appeared 
to have found the language acceptable even though (and perhaps because) it 
was ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations, thus leaving to another 
time and another institution the question of what types of ideological 
principles the government would have to respect.47 
 
In many other places, the makers of the 2004 Constitution apparently 
chose to defer explicitly through adopting by-law clauses in the text of the 
                                                        
38 See generally U.N. Secretary General, Letter dated Dec. 5, 2001 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001).  
39 Id. ¶¶ I.1–4. 
40 Id. ¶ 6. 
41 Barnett R. Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2004, at 5, 10. 
42 See generally id. 
43 Pasarlay, Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, supra note 29, at 173. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Nathan J. Brown, Bargaining and Imposing Constitutions: Private and Public Interests in the 
Iranian, Afghani, and Iraqi Constitutional Experiments, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCES TO TURKEY, IRAQ, IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN 72 (Said Amir Arjomand ed., 
2008). 
47 Id. 
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Constitution.48  For instance, the text of the 2004 Constitution attempts to 
guarantee liberal democracy and governance by providing a long list of 
protected rights and freedoms, including social, political, and property 
rights.49  Nevertheless, the Constitution does not simply declare most rights 
to be constitutionally guaranteed.  Rather, it attempts to constitutionalize 
basic rights in some ways and instructs the downstream legislature through 
the adoption of by-law clauses to define the scope of the protected rights and 
freedoms and then to enact laws that would define the powers of the 
institutions that will protect those rights.50 
 
In this way, the makers of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan 
deployed deferral as a strategic tool.51  In fact, constitutional deferral helped 
them to reach agreement and build minimum consensus on many 
contentious questions of constitutional design at the drafting stage, including 
basic rights and the ideology of the state.52  In a perfect scenario, the drafters 
of the 2004 Constitution might have elaborated more fully the values of the 
state and the scope of liberal rights that the Constitution purported to 
guarantee.  However, in a situation where Afghanistan’s powerful and well-
armed divided communities did not agree on foundational issues, they 
accepted that the final deal would have to be negotiated incrementally.53  
Both Afghan elites and society seem to be happy maintaining the deferred 
order on these aspects of constitutional design and have opted to resolve 
them over time as greater consensus is forged.54 
 
A.  The Drafters’ Decision to Defer the Powers of the Supreme 
Court and the Commission to Exercise Judicial Review 
 
Judicial review and constitutional interpretation—particularly, the 
question of where to vest the power to issue binding judicial review 
opinions—was a contentious issue during the drafting of the 2004 
Constitution of Afghanistan.55  At first, the makers of the 2004 Constitution 
                                                        
48 Pasarlay, Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, supra note 29, at 172–260. 
49 QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [AFG. CONST. 2004] [CONSTITUTION] Jan. 
26, 2004, arts. 22–57. 
50 Id. 
51 Pasarlay, Making the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, supra note 29, at 261–66. 
52 Id. at 172–302. 
53 Id. at 261–302. 
54 Id. 
55 Shamshad Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Review in Afghanistan: Is 
There Still a Crisis?, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/03/ 
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proposed a separate and independent constitutional court with explicit 
powers to interpret the Constitution and exercise constitutional review.56  
However, the then-president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai opposed the 
constitutional court, arguing that it would become something like the Iranian 
Council of Guardians that would use constitutional provisions, specifically 
those dealing with Islam and the sharia, to undermine the political system 
and strike down legislation on religious grounds.57  Karzai and his allies 
ultimately succeeded in removing the constitutional court from the draft 
Constitution before the draft was adopted.58 
 
When the makers of the 2004 Constitution dropped the proposed 
constitutional court, they vested the Supreme Court with the power to 
exercise judicial review and interpret the Constitution.59  Article 121 of the 
draft Constitution, submitted to the Constitutional Loya Jirga (the popular 
body that adopted the 2004 Constitution) for approval, stated:  “at the 
request of the government and courts, the Supreme Court shall review the 
compliance of laws, legislative decrees and international treaties with the 
constitution; the Supreme Court shall have the power to interpret laws, 
legislative decrees, international treaties and the Constitution.”60 
 
During debates at the Constitutional Loya Jirga (“CLJ”), judicial 
review and constitutional interpretation once again took center stage.  The 
majority of the delegates at the CLJ opposed the provisions of the draft 
Constitution that gave the Supreme Court the power to exercise judicial 
review and interpret the Constitution.61  They complained that such a cleric-
dominated Supreme Court would compromise fundamental rights, especially 
the rights of women and minorities, by using vague sharia law provisions, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
constitutional-interpretation-and-constitutional-review-in-afghanistan-is-there-still-a-crisis/ [hereinafter, 
Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation]; see also John Dempsey & J. Alexander Thier, Resolving the Crisis 
over Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan, PEACE BRIEFING (U.S. Inst. of Peace, Washington, D.C.), 
Mar. 2009, http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/USIP_0309_2.PDF. 
56 See Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 55; Dempsey & Thier, supra note 55. 
57 See Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 55; Dempsey & Thier, supra note 55. 
58 Said Amir Arjomand, Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan: A Comparative and Historical 
Perspective, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 943, 959 (2005). 
59 Constitutional Drafting Comm’n, Draft Constitution of Afghanistan as Revised by the Executive, 
art. 121 (Dec. 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Const. Draft of 2003]. 
60 Id. (emphasis added). 
61 Int’l Crisis Grp., Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary, at 16, Asia Report No. 195 (Nov. 17, 
2010), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/124332/195%20Reforming%20Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary 
.pdf. 
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such as Article 3 of the Constitution, as justification.62  Article 3 states that 
“no law shall contradict the provisions and the beliefs of the sacred religion 
of Islam.” 63   The proponents of the constitutional court argued that the 
Supreme Court, as it was then comprised of mullahs (those versed in sharia 
law only), who were not trained in public law or constitutional law, should 
not be the institution to interpret the Constitution and exercise judicial 
review.64  Karzai and his supporters, however, continued to argue against 
including a constitutional court in the country’s next Constitution.65 
 
The discussion over the constitutional court at the CLJ seemed to be 
going nowhere, “ending in deadlock between the majority of the CLJ 
members and the supporters of President Karzai.”66  To break the stalemate 
and achieve a minimum agreement on which institution should interpret the 
Constitution, the CLJ and President Karzai ultimately agreed on a 
Commission that would oversee the implementation of the Constitution.67  
Although it was no replacement for a constitutional court, the CLJ hoped 
that the establishment of the Commission would go “a small way to repair 
the absence of a constitutional court and may one day counter the clerical 
domination of the Supreme Court.”68  However, the final draft Constitution 
did not clarify how the Commission was to be organized and what powers it 
would enjoy.69  It remained intentionally unclear whether the Commission 
was empowered to issue binding substantive interpretations of the 
Constitution, meaning that the Commission would interpret the Constitution 
and the Supreme Court would be obliged to rule in accordance with the 
Commission’s reading of the Constitution. 
 
B. The Commission and Its Unclear Mandate 
 
Although the CLJ finalized the 2004 Constitution, it did not define the 
powers of the Commission.  In other words, the CLJ deferred the powers of 
                                                        
62 Id. at 8; Arjomand, supra note 58, at 959. 
63 AFG. CONST. 2004 art. 3. 
64 Int’l Crisis Grp., Afghanistan: The Constitutional Loya Jirga, at 8–9, Asia Briefing No. 29 (Dec. 
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68 Id. 
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the Commission to the legislature. The CLJ-approved version of the 
Commission in draft Article 157 looked like the following: “An Independent 
Commission for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution 
should be established in accordance with the provisions of the law.” 70  
Article 157 is deliberately ambiguous as to whether the Commission is 
empowered to interpret the Constitution or exercise judicial review. 
 
This last minute inclusion of the Commission into the draft 
Constitution begot confusion over which institution should exercise all 
forms of judicial review and interpret the Constitution.71  The confusion 
arose primarily because of the explicit and implicit deferrals in Articles 121 
and 157 of the CLJ draft, especially due to the changes that the CLJ brought 
to Article 121 of the draft Constitution.72  Before the inclusion of Article 
157,73 Article 121 of the draft Constitution read:  “At the request of the 
government, or courts, the Supreme Court shall review laws, legislative 
decrees, international treaties as well as international covenants for their 
compliance with the constitution.  The Supreme Court can interpret laws, 
legislative decrees and the Constitution.”74  
 
This language in draft Article 121 clearly settled the powers of the 
Supreme Court and contained no deferrals.  However, the language in draft 
Article 121 changed after the CLJ inserted Article 157 in its finalized draft.  
The final version of Article 121 reads:  “At the request of the government, or 
courts, the Supreme Court shall review laws, legislative decrees, 
international treaties as well as international covenants for their compliance 
with the Constitution, and interpret them in accordance with the law.”75 
 
Unlike the earlier versions of Article 121, in the final version of 
Article 121, the Supreme Court is not clearly authorized to interpret the 
Constitution.76  The final version of Article 121 directs the Supreme Court to 
“interpret them in accordance with the law,” making it difficult to 
understand whether or not this includes the interpretation of the 
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Constitution.77  The matter was complicated because Article 157 did not 
make clear whether or not the Commission is tasked with interpreting the 
Constitution.78  In fact, both Articles 121 and 157 of the 2004 Constitution 
signal deferral through by-law clauses and through strategic constitutional 
ambiguity.  They do not define the powers of these institutions clearly.  
Instead, they leave it to the legislature to adopt a separate law that would 
define the powers and organization of the Commission and the powers of the 
Supreme Court to exercise judicial review.79 
 
This type of constitutional deferral is extremely dangerous.  Although 
these deferrals arguably promoted agreement at CLJ negotiations, they later 
became the crux of a political crisis over which institution, the Supreme 
Court or the Commission, should interpret the Constitution and review the 
constitutionality of laws and legislative decrees. 80   They particularly 
polarized the relationship between the legislature and the Supreme Court and 
undermined the Supreme Court’s legitimacy, independence, and institutional 
viability.81  Moreover, the legislature used these constitutional deferrals to 
refuse to empower the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution and 
exercise all types of judicial review functions and to strike at the 
independence of the Commission.82  In short, deferrals on the powers of the 
Supreme Court and the Commission led to the inability of both institutions 
to resolve key constitutional issues. 
 
IV. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF DEFERRALS ON THE POWERS OF 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMISSION  
 
The makers of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan deliberately used 
deferral as a tool to promote agreement and prevent decision and error 
costs.83   Some of these deferrals, such as those on the questions of ideology 
                                                        
77 Id. 
78 Const. Draft of 2003, supra note 59, art. 157. 
79 Id. arts. 121, 157. 
80 Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 55; Dempsey & Thier, supra note 55. 
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of the state and fundamental rights, have proven successful. 84   These 
deferrals promoted agreement during the 2002–2004 constitution-making 
process and have helped the 2004 Constitution survive for more than 
fourteen years thus far.85  Although there has never been clear political or 
judicial action clarifying the meaning and the practical impact of the vague 
ideological clauses in the 2004 Constitution, the Afghan government and 
society both seem to be comfortable leaving the question to the future, at 
which point they will have to clarify what these clauses mean and what 
practical constraints they place on the government. Therefore, this deferral 
arguably leads to the survival of the 2004 Constitution into the distant 
future.86  
 
However, some of the deferrals in the 2004 Constitution have not 
been successful.  The history of the 2004 Constitution thus far suggests that 
deferrals on the powers and organization of the Supreme Court and the 
Commission have not fared well.  In the absence of clear constitutional 
provisions settling the very important question of the powers of the Supreme 
Court and the Commission, the political branches of the government—the 
executive and the legislature—took the responsibility to define the power 
and organization of these two institutions.87  However, the legislature and 
the executive prepared legislation in a way that attempted to increase their 
control and influence over both the Supreme Court and the Commission.88  
In fact, the executive and the legislature competed with each other to get the 
most out of this ambiguous constitutional formula. 89   The powers, 
independence, and institutional security of the Supreme Court and the 
Commission were the ultimate victims of the rivalry between the executive 
and the legislature to exert influence on the Supreme Court and the 
Commission.90 
 
Initially, after the 2004 Constitution was promulgated, the Supreme 
Court assumed the power to interpret the Constitution, provide legal advice, 
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and exercise all judicial review functions. 91   From 2005 to 2007, the 
Supreme Court issued a number of decisions and tried to claim jurisdiction 
over disputes stemming from the implementation of law and the exercise of 
legal authority between the legislature and the executive.92  For example, 
after the 2004 presidential elections and the 2005 elections for the 
Parliament’s lower house, the Afghan government failed to hold district 
council elections.93  As a result, the upper house of the Parliament could not 
be constitutionally elected because one-third of its members were to be from 
district councils.94  President Karzai asked the Supreme Court to rule on how 
to constitute the upper house properly in the absence of district council 
elections.95  The Supreme Court ruled that, when district council elections 
are not held, provisional councils should elect two-thirds of the members of 
the upper house.96  In normal circumstances, provisional councils elect one-
third of the members of the upper house.97  Based on the opinion of the 
Supreme Court, provincial councils elected two-thirds of the upper house. 
 
Similarly, in 2006, another constitutional dispute emerged between 
the legislature and the executive over the meaning of the word “akthariyyat” 
(majority) in parliamentary votes to approve governmental ministers and 
Supreme Court justices. 98   The question was whether “majority votes” 
included the majority votes of all members of the Parliament or the majority 
votes of those members present in a particular parliamentary session. 99  
Again, President Karzai asked the Supreme Court to rule on this question.100  
The Supreme Court held that akthariyyat in parliamentary votes to approve 
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cabinet ministers and the Supreme Court justices meant the majority votes of 
members present in a particular parliamentary session.101 
 
The Supreme Court’s decisions were apparently accepted, and they 
seemed to demonstrate that the Supreme Court possessed the final legal 
authority to invalidate legislation, interpret the Constitution, and resolve 
political disputes between the political branches of the government. 102  
During this time, the legislature did not exercise its right to resolve 
constitutional deferrals on the powers of the Supreme Court and the 
Commission.103  As a result, the Supreme Court continued to exercise its 
right to perform judicial review and interpret the Constitution without any 
opposition.104 
A. Resolving Deferrals on the Powers of the Supreme Court and 
the Commission 
 
In May 2007, the Afghan Parliament voted to remove the then-
Foreign Minister, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, from his ministerial post.  The 
Parliament accused the Foreign Minister of failing to prevent the forceful 
deportation of Afghan refugees from Iran. 105   President Karzai did not 
recognize the Parliament’s decision and challenged the Parliament’s removal 
powers before the Supreme Court. 106   The Supreme Court ruled that, 
although the Parliament had an implied constitutional right to remove a 
government minister, the Parliament did not follow appropriate procedures 
in removing Minister Spanta.107  The Parliament refused to acknowledge the 
Supreme Court’s ruling, arguing that the Supreme Court did not have the 
power to invalidate the Parliament’s decision to remove government 
ministers under Article 121 of the Constitution. 108   The Parliament 
maintained that Article 121 of the Constitution only gave the Supreme Court 
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the power to review the constitutionality of laws, not the power to invalidate 
Parliament’s power to appoint or remove a government minister.109  In other 
words, the Parliament argued that the Supreme Court did not have 
jurisdiction to resolve political disputes between the legislature and the 
executive.  As such, confusion arose over which institution could resolve 
such disputes.110 
 
In response to this crisis, the executive and the legislature both tried to 
clarify the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Commission by opting 
to resolve constitutional deferrals in Articles 121 and 157.111  They chose to 
adopt the constitutionally-mandated legislation that would define the powers 
and organization of the Supreme Court and the Commission.112  However, 
the executive and the legislature designed the constitutionally-mandated 
laws in a way that would considerably increase the control of the political 
branches over the judiciary, thereby weakening both the Supreme Court and 
the Commission. 113   These laws specifically limited the powers of the 
Supreme Court and the Commission to safeguard the Constitution. They 
stripped the Supreme Court of its power to exercise all types of judicial 
review and to interpret the Constitution.114 
 
To resolve this jurisdictional question, the Supreme Court first 
proposed legislation that would clarify its authority. 115   Specifically, the 
Supreme Court proposed an amendment to the Law on the Organization and 
Jurisdiction of the Courts (2005).  The amendment would explicitly allow 
the Supreme Court to exercise judicial review, interpret the Constitution, and 
resolve other disputes resulting from the application of law and the exercise 
of legal authority between the legislature and the executive (cases like that 
of Minister Spanta). 116   However, the Parliament rejected the Supreme 
Court’s amendment proposal.  It declared that, under Article 121, the 
Supreme Court did not have the power to interpret the Constitution, 
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invalidate the Parliament’s power to remove a government minister, or 
resolve political disputes between the legislature and the executive.117 
 
When the Parliament rejected the Supreme Court’s proposed 
amendment to the Law on the Organization and Jurisdiction of the Courts, 
the executive drafted a law on the Commission under Article 157 of the 
Constitution attempting to resolve the constitutional deferral.118  This law 
would have allowed the Commission to perform a priori review of 
governmental bills before the Parliament’s approval and provide legal advice 
to the president on questions emerging from the Constitution. 119   The 
executive’s proposed legislation also empowered the Commission to review 
the laws of previous governments for their compliance with the Constitution 
and advise the president in this respect; the president would then take the 
required action.120  Nevertheless, the Parliament amended the draft law of 
the Commission.  The Parliament removed the explicit language that 
empowered the Commission to provide an advisory opinion on legislation 
before the approval of the Parliament.121  Instead, the Parliament included a 
provision that vested in the Commission the power to interpret the 
Constitution on the request of the president, the Parliament, and the Supreme 
Court.122   
 
President Karzai vetoed this legislation because he believed that the 
language in Article 8 of the law of the Commission, which empowered the 
Commission to interpret the Constitution, violated the Constitution. 123  
President Karzai specifically argued that:  (1) Article 121 of the Constitution 
empowered only the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution and (2) the 
Constitution gave the Commission only the power to oversee the 
implementation of the Constitution and not the authority to interpret it.124  
The Parliament overrode President Karzai’s veto by two-thirds majority, 
making it enforceable legislation. 125   President Karzai then asked the 
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Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of the Commission’s law.126  
The Supreme Court ruled that Article 8(1) of the law of the Commission, 
which authorized the Commission to interpret the Constitution, was 
unconstitutional.127  The Supreme Court held that the drafters of the 2004 
Constitution intended for the Supreme Court to be the only institution to 
interpret the Constitution.128  The Commission was intended to supervise the 
implementation of the Constitution and it did not have the right to interpret 
the Constitution.129 
 
The Parliament once again rejected the Supreme Court’s ruling, 
stating that, although the Supreme Court had the power to review the 
constitutionality of legislation, it faced “a conflict of interest” in invalidating 
the law of the Commission.130   Consequently, the Parliament refused to 
amend the law of the Commission to accommodate the opinion of the 
Supreme Court.131  Finally, notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme 
Court, in May 2010, the Parliament moved to approve candidates appointed 
by President Karzai for membership in the Commission under its 
“spuriously passed legislation.”132   In a June 2010 parliamentary session 
convened to approve the members of the Commission, Commission 
nominees openly acknowledged that they would exercise the Commission’s 
authority to interpret the Constitution and provide legal advice so long as it 
maintained the support of the Parliament.133  Upon its creation, and backed 
strongly by the Parliament, the Commission undertook the task of 
interpreting the Constitution despite opposition from the executive and the 
Supreme Court. 134   However, it remains unclear whether or not the 
Commission’s opinions are binding.135 
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B. The Final Outcome of Deferrals on the Powers of the Supreme 
Court and the Commission 
 
Using constitutional deferrals on the powers of the Supreme Court, 
the legislature stripped the Supreme Court of its power to interpret the 
Constitution and exercise all judicial review.  Furthermore, by adopting 
constitutionally-mandated legislation the legislature established a rival 
institution, the Commission, and empowered it to interpret the 
Constitution.136  Similarly, soon after the Commission was established in 
2010, the executive began to strengthen the Commission vis-à-vis the 
Supreme Court.  The Commission requested the executive send the 
Commission all draft governmental bills for a review of their 
constitutionality before approval by the Parliament. 137   In response, 
President Karzai issued Decree No. 11371 authorizing the Commission to 
perform a priori review of all governmental bills.138  This meant that the 
Supreme Court would not be able to exercise a priori review of legislation. 
In other words, when the Commission performs a priori review, it precludes 
the Supreme Court from performing such a priori reviews of draft bills.139 
 
Moreover, although President Karzai and his government initially 
opposed the Commission’s power to interpret the Constitution, shortly after 
the Commission was established, they began sending the Commission 
interpretive requests on constitutional questions.140  The executive thus, in 
essence, acquiesced to the Commission’s power to interpret the Constitution, 
perform a priori review of laws, and offer legal advice to the political 
branches on constitutional questions.141  In fact, President Karzai and his 
administration began to play a strategic role, submitting simultaneous 
requests for judicial review and constitutional interpretation to both the 
Supreme Court and the Commission as a “means of hedging bets in case one 
institution offered a more favorable opinion.”142 
 
For example, in 2010, a dispute emerged over the result of 
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parliamentary elections between the government of President Karzai and 
Afghanistan’s electoral institutions, the Independent Election Commission 
(“IEC”) and the Independent Election Complaints Commission (“IECC”).143 
Karzai claimed the 2010 parliamentary election was plagued with fraud and 
systemic electoral engineering.144  The IEC claimed that it had the power to 
hear and resolve electoral complaints.145   Karzai, however, established a 
special court to resolve the electoral disputes.146  No laws in Afghanistan, 
including the Constitution and electoral laws, provide for a special court to 
review election results. 147   The Constitution and electoral laws vest the 
power to resolve electoral disputes in the IEC and the IECC.148  The question 
of the constitutionality of the Special Election Court (“SEC”) thus caused 
consternation.  The Commission held the SEC unconstitutional, arguing that 
the IEC and the IECC have the power to resolve electoral disputes. 149  
Seeing that the Commission declared the SEC unconstitutional, President 
Karzai asked the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of the 
SEC.150  The Supreme Court promptly ruled that the establishment of the 
SEC to investigate electoral complaints was consistent with the 
Constitution. 151   The Supreme Court’s decision angered the winning 
candidates to the Parliament who refused to accept the opinion of the 
Supreme Court, arguing that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction was limited to 
the review of the constitutionality of legislation under Article 121 of the 
Constitution, and that the Supreme Court’s powers did not extend to 
resolving electoral disputes.152 
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Therefore, constitutional deferrals on the powers of the Supreme 
Court and the Commission took Afghan constitutional politics in an 
uncharted direction.  In the absence of clear constitutional provisions 
defining the powers of the Supreme Court and the Commission, the political 
branches of the government adopted legislation that vested two different 
bodies with the power to interpret the Constitution and exercise different 
types of judicial review powers.153  Apparently, politicians and courts alike 
have started to treat the vaguely-described Commission as a de facto 
constitutional court with the power of pre-promulgation abstract review, 
while treating Afghanistan’s Supreme Court as a body empowered to carry 
out post-promulgation abstract review of legislation and concrete judicial 
review. 154   This dual institutional mechanism is a counterproductive 
development that the makers of the 2004 Constitution had hoped to avoid 
after they removed the constitutional court from the earlier drafts of the 2004 
Constitution. 
 
V.  DEFERRAL AS A TOOL TO UNDERMINE THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMISSION 
 
Deferrals on the powers of the Supreme Court and the Commission 
not only undermined the power, independence, and institutional security of 
these two bodies, but also gave the legislature too much power and 
discretion vis-à-vis the judiciary.  In fact, these deferrals gave the legislature 
a tool to use against the Supreme Court and the Commission any time it 
desires.  The text of Article 121, which in essence describes the Supreme 
Court’s judicial review power, leaves many questions open.155  It does not 
make clear whether the Supreme Court possesses the power to interpret the 
Constitution and exercise all forms of judicial review functions. 156   In 
addition, it remains contested to this day which institution can resolve 
political disputes that arise between the legislature and the executive (like 
the case of Spanta).157  Under the 2004 Constitution, answers to all of these 
important questions require the approval of the legislature.  Unless the 
legislature is willing to resolve them, they will remain unresolved 
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indefinitely, or they will be resolved in a way that undermines the powers 
and independence of the judiciary. 
 
Although the Supreme Court on several occasions tried to clarify 
these questions by proposing constitutionally-mandated legislation under 
Article 121, 158  the legislature refused to approve any laws that would 
empower the Supreme Court to resolve political cases or interpret the 
Constitution. 159   Part of the reason is that, under Article 121 of the 
Constitution, only the government and courts have the right to challenge the 
constitutionality of legislation and make constitutional interpretation 
requests to the Supreme Court. 160   This mechanism does not give the 
legislature or other institutions (such as political parties) standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of laws or executive action before the 
Supreme Court.161  Apparently for this very reason, the legislature refuses to 
empower and accept the Supreme Court as a constitutional interpretation 
body. 
 
Moreover, in the post-Spanta controversy, the Supreme Court’s 
legislative proposals, which attempted to authorize the Supreme Court to 
interpret the Constitution and resolve political disputes, created political 
backlashes that severely limited the power of the Supreme Court to interpret 
the Constitution and to exercise all types of constitutional review 
functions. 162   Fearing further repercussions, the Supreme Court tried to 
propose legislation to clarify its constitutional jurisdiction—thereby leading 
to troubling gaps in Afghanistan’s constitutional review system. 163   For 
example, no institution apparently has the power to resolve a dispute that 
stems from the implementation of law and the exercise of legal authority 
between the legislature and the executive. 164   As a result, many recent 
constitutional disputes between the legislature and the executive were 
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ultimately resolved through politics and political intervention without the 
intervention of either the Supreme Court or the Commission.165 
 
The Supreme Court is not the only institution that has suffered 
because the drafters of the 2004 Constitution decided to defer on its powers.  
Today, the Commission is in an awkward position, primarily because of 
deferrals on its powers and organization. 166   While the Parliament 
empowered the Commission to interpret the Constitution and perform a 
priori review of governmental bills, it has usually resorted to retaliatory 
measures every time the Commission has decided a case in a way that has 
not secured the interests of the Parliament.167  For instance, in the later years 
of President Karzai’s term, when the Commission issued a large number of 
interpretive and advisory opinions that favored the executive,168  Parliament 
retaliated by impeaching the Commission’s members and refusing to 
approve the sitting members in office for a second term.169  In addition, the 
Parliament has several times threatened to amend the law of the Commission 
and strip it of its constitutional interpretation and abstract constitutional 
review powers—threats that have severely undermined the independence 
and institutional viability of the Commission.170 
 
For example, in July 2016, on the request of President Ashraf Ghani, 
the Commission issued an opinion clarifying the legal status of Presidential 
Decree No. 159 on election reform.171  The lower house of the Parliament, 
                                                        
165 Worden & Sinha, supra note 95, at 3–4. 
166 See Ali Yawar Adili & Ehsan Qaane, The Constitutional Oversight Commission in a Standoff with 
President Ghani: Defending Their Independence or Covering up Mistakes?, AFG. ANALYSTS NETWORK 
(Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-constitutional-oversight-commission-in-a-
standoff-with-president-ghani-defending-their-independence-or-covering-up-mistakes/. 
167 Khawaja Basir Fitri, WJ Summons ICOIC Members on Electoral Reform Decree, PAJHWAK 
AFGHAN NEWS (Sept. 17, 2016, 4:11 PM), http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2016/09/17/wj-summons-icoic-
members-electoral-reform-decree. 
168 See generally MAJMUA-YE TAFSIR HA, NAẓARIYA HA WA MASHWARA HAI ḤUQUQI-YE KAMISON-I 
MUSTAQIL-I NIẓARAT BAR TAṬBIQ-I QANUN-I ASSASI [THE COLLECTION OF INTERPRETIVE AND LEGAL 
ADVICE OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION] (2014). 
169 Parliament Did Not Issue Vote of Confidence to the Members of the Independent Commission for 
the Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution, BBC FARSI (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/persian/afghanistan/2014/07/140719_k05_afg_constitution_commisision. 
170 See Adili & Qaane, supra note 166. 
171 Under the National Unity Government Agreement, which brought the 2014 contested presidential 
election to an end, the government is required to amend the Afghan electoral system’s laws and institutions, 
as well as the 2004 Constitution to include a post for a prime minister. However, reforming the electoral 
system has been problematic, as the parliament rejected several presidential decrees on election reform. See 
Afghan Parliament Rejects President Ghani’s Decree on Electoral Reforms, KHAAMA PRESS (June 13, 
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the Wolesi Jirga, had rejected Presidential Decree No. 159.172  The upper 
house, however, had approved the decree.173  A joint commission of the two 
houses was required by law.174  However, before the joint commission could 
decide the fate of Decree No. 159, the Parliament went on a summer 
recess.175  President Ashraf Ghani referred Presidential Decree No. 159 to 
the Commission and requested its opinion on (1) the legal status of Decree 
No. 159, (2) whether the president could issue another decree on electoral 
reform during parliamentary recess, and (3) whether the president was 
required to submit the new electoral reform decree to the Parliament for 
approval after it reconvened.176 
 
The Commission held that, when a joint commission of the two 
houses of the Parliament rejects a presidential decree, the decree becomes 
legally invalid.177  However, the Commission stated that the president could 
issue another electoral reform decree when the Parliament is in recess.178  
The Commission further clarified that the president is not required to submit 
the new electoral reform decree to the Parliament for approval in the 
Parliament’s last year in office under Article 109 of the Constitution.179  
Article 109 of the Constitution states that any proposals for amending the 
election laws should not be included in the agenda of the Parliament for 
consideration in the final year of its term. 180   Citing this Article, the 
Commission held that the president is not required to seek the approval of 
the Parliament on the new electoral reform decree because the Parliament is 
in the last year of its term.181  Two earlier electoral reform decrees had 
already been rejected by the Parliament.182  The Parliament expected that the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2016), http://www.khaama.com/afghan-parliament-rejects-president-ghanis-decree-on-electoral-reforms-
01242. 
172 See id. 
173 Id. 
174 AFG. CONST. 2004 art. 100. 
175 Legal Opinion of the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of Constitution 
Regarding the Request of the President on the Legal Status of Presidential Decree No. 159 Enacting the 
Law on the Organization, Jurisdiction and Duties of the Independent Electoral Commission and Electoral 





180 AFG. CONST. 2004 art. 109. 
181 Commission’s Decree No. 159 Opinion, supra note 175. 
182 Ali Yawar Adili et al., Another Hurdle for Elections in 2016: MPs Reject Presidential Decree on 
Electoral Reform, AFG. ANALYSTS NETWORK (June 17, 2016), https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/ 
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June 2018 The Limits of Constitutional Deferral 709 
executive would submit any electoral reform decree for approval to the 
Parliament after it reconvened.  However, this did not happen and the next 
presidential decree on electoral reform became enforceable law without 
parliamentary approval.183 
 
The Parliament reacted strongly to the Commission’s opinion on 
Presidential Decree No. 159 and threatened to retaliate.184  The Parliament 
first tried to impeach the members of the Commission and summoned them 
for questioning.185  However, the members of the Commission refused to 
respond to the request of the Parliament.186  They stated that the Parliament 
did not have the right to impeach the members of the Commission.187  The 
Commission argued that the Parliament could only impeach governmental 
ministers and the justices of the Supreme Court under the Constitution, not 
the members of the Commission. 188   This move further infuriated the 
Parliament; it argued that it had the right to impeach any government official 
to whom it gives a vote of confidence.189  The Commission still chose not to 
appear before the Parliament for questioning.190 
 
When the Parliament failed to impeach the members of the 
Commission, it then threatened to resort to further retaliatory measures to 
undermine the independence of the Commission.191  Chief among them, the 
Parliament warned that it would amend the law of the Commission to reduce 
the Commission’s powers over constitutional questions, specifically its 
power to interpret the Constitution, provide legal advice, and perform a 
priori review of legislation.192  This threat forced the Commission to issue 
an opinion clarifying its position and trying to calm the increasing rift with 
the Parliament,193 but the Parliament was not convinced.194 
                                                        
183 See Ali Yawar Adili & Martine van Bijlert, Update on Afghanistan’s Electoral Process: Electoral 
Deadlock Broken—For Now, AFG. ANALYSTS NETWORK (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.afghanistan-
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Although the Parliament has not yet decided when (and whether) to 
amend the law of the Commission, its threat to do so has been a direct attack 
on the independence of the Commission.  Indeed, the Parliament might not 
choose to strip the Commission of its power to interpret the Constitution and 
offer legal advice on constitutional matters because doing so will eliminate 
the venue in which the Parliament can challenge governmental conduct for 
constitutionality and request interpretive constitutional opinions.  However, 
the fact that the Parliament threatened to amend the law of the Commission 
is a clear warning that going against the Parliament might trigger severe 
repercussions and political backlash that would undermine the legitimacy, 
independence, impartiality, and institutional security of the Commission, 
thus reducing its power. 
 
This threat has already proved to be effective.  In November 2016, 
Parliament voted to strip seven cabinet ministers of their ministerial posts 
over their failure to spend seventy percent of their developmental budget.195  
President Ashraf Ghani requested that the Supreme Court examine the 
constitutionality of the Parliament’s decision to remove these ministers.196  
Parliament reacted strongly to the president’s referral and argued that the 
Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear such cases under Article 121 
of the Constitution.197  Despite opposition from the Parliament, the Supreme 
Court decided to review the constitutionality of the Parliament’s power to 
remove these ministers from office. 198   Interestingly, however, the 
Commission was reluctant to enter into this debate.  The Commission stated 
that, although the Parliament has a legal right to summon and impeach 
governmental ministers, the current series of impeachments shall be assessed 
by the Supreme Court to determine whether the removal of ministers by the 
Parliament has been “explicit” and “based on convincing reasons,” as 
described in Article 92 of the Constitution.199  It seems that the Commission 
did not try to seek jurisdiction over this dispute, which clearly involved 
constitutional interpretation.  Apparently, the Commission feared that its 
                                                        
195 See MPs Dismiss Another Minister, Bringing Total to 7 in 4 Days, TOLONEWS (Nov. 15, 2016), 
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decision might create strong opponents who would reject its decision, which 
may in turn threaten its independence and institutional viability. 
 
In this way, the political branches of the government have taken 
advantage of constitutional deferrals on the powers of the Supreme Court 
and the Commission to threaten the Court and the Commission’s 
institutional security, undermine their independence and impartiality, and 
limit their powers.  Moreover, the Parliament is basically taking the law of 
the Commission hostage, using it against the Commission whenever the 
Commission issues an opinion that does not secure the interests of the 
Parliament.  The matter is further complicated because both the Supreme 
Court and the Commission have no means to resist the Parliament in this 
respect. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
Theorists of constitutional deferral argue that an optimal level of 
constitutional deferral provides a significant and valuable mechanism for 
constitutional writers. 200   Constitutional deferrals might help promote 
agreement at the constitution drafting and ratifying stage.  Deferral might 
further increase constitutional flexibility by explicitly entrusting 
constitutional questions to the legislature by authorizing or requiring them to 
address some constitutionally significant questions via sub-constitutional 
legislation. This technique might lead to the survival of formal written 
constitutions and help promote constitutional stability.201  At the same time, 
however, deferral is not optimal for all constitutional issues.  It is important 
that constitutional framers do not rely heavily on deferral.  Specifically, they 
should settle important procedural questions in the constitution so that the 
function of government is not impeded. 202   Theorists of constitutional 
deferral argue that if too many significant constitutional questions are 
explicitly deferred to ordinary legislation, the constitution might become 
more fragile and have less longevity.203 
 
Importantly, thus far, the history of the 2004 Constitution of 
Afghanistan suggests that in addition to the constitutional fragility created 
                                                        
200 See generally Dixon & Ginsburg, supra note 1. 
201 See id. at 637–38. 
202 Id. at 664. 
203 Id. at 666–67. 
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through the use of too many deferrals, deferring to articulate the powers of 
the institutions entrusted to resolve other deferrals may also create 
constitutional instability.  Deferral on the powers and organization of such 
institutions may result in direct political conflicts between the judiciary and 
the legislation because deferral politicizes the relationship between the 
legislature and the judiciary. The politicization of the relationship between 
the legislature and the judiciary might in turn put the institutional security 
and independence of the judiciary at stake.  Particularly, in fragile and 
transitioning democracies like Afghanistan, these types of deferrals create 
serious problems.  In these new democracies, the legislature may be ill-
equipped to deal with unresolved issues of the powers and organization of 
apex courts.  In such contexts, as occurred in Afghanistan, unresolved 
questions of the powers of institutions expected to resolve implicit deferrals 
engender costly political crises every time a dispute emerges between the 
legislature and the executive.  Furthermore, such deferrals lead to the failure 
of apex constitutional courts to resolve some key constitutional questions. 
 
The history of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan suggests that it is 
important that constitutional designers decide the important question of the 
powers of constitutional interpretation bodies in the text of the constitution.  
If constitutions defer on these questions, downstream legislatures may refuse 
to empower such institutions, leading to political tension among the various 
branches of the government.  More controversially, downstream legislatures 
might simply take by-law deferrals hostage and keep constitutional review 
and constitutional interpretation bodies under their watch by threatening to 
amend their law and strip them of their powers any time it favors the 
legislature. 
 
The decision of the makers of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan to 
defer on the powers of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution, and 
on the mandate of the Commission and the subsequent reactionary 
parliamentary legislations clearly highlight these dangers.  In the Afghan 
example, we see how the legislature used by-law deferrals not only to 
undermine the independence of the Supreme Court but also to create a rival 
constitutional interpretation body—the Commission—thereby limiting the 
powers of the Supreme Court.  As a result, there is no unified hierarchical 
institutional mechanism to interpret the Constitution and exercise all types of 
constitutional review.  Instead, many constitutional disputes are resolved 
through politics rather than judicial intervention. 
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Finally, deferral on the powers of the Supreme Court and the 
Commission has led to a troubling gap in Afghanistan’s judicial review 
system.  Today, no institution can hear and resolve disputes stemming from 
the implementation of law and the exercise of legal authority between the 
legislature and the executive (cases like that of Minister Spanta).  Although 
the Supreme Court tried to clarify this question in the aftermath of the 
Spanta controversy, the Parliament rejected the Supreme Court’s proposal, 
which also triggered a political backlash against the institutional security of 
the Supreme Court.  As a result, the question remains unclear because the 
legislature simply does not want to have the Supreme Court (or any other 
institution for that matter) serve as a check on its powers, especially on its 
power to appoint and remove government ministers and Supreme Court 
justices.  This deferral has further deprived Afghanistan of a crucial 
mechanism to institutional democracy by safeguarding the Constitution. 
 
In short, authorizing or requiring the legislature to address the powers 
and organization of apex courts via sub-constitutional lawmaking is 
dangerous because downstream legislatures will rarely limit their own 
powers by such authorization of courts.  Constitution makers need to decide 
what powers these institutions shall enjoy, thus avoiding constitutional crises 
of the type we saw in Afghanistan.  If constitution makers do not address 
these questions, the legislatures will likely never address them—leading to 
direct conflicts between the legislature and the judiciary. If not addressed, 
these conflicts will undermine the independence, authority, and institutional 
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